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Monetary Policy obeying the Taylor Principle Turns





Monetary policy affects the degree of strategic complementarity in firms’ pricing de-
cisions if it responds to the aggregate price level. In normal times, when monopolis-
tic competitive firms increase their prices, the central bank raises interest rates, which
lowers consumption demand and creates an incentive for firms to reduce their prices.
Thereby, monetary policy reduces the degree of strategic complementarities among firms’
pricing decisions and even turns prices into strategic substitutes if the effect of interest
rates on demand is sufficiently strong. We show that this condition holds when mone-
tary policy follows the Taylor principle. By contrast, in a liquidity trap where monetary
policy is restricted by the zero lower bound, pricing decisions are strategic complements.
Our main contribution consists in relating the determinacy and stability of equilibria to
strategic substitutability in prices. We discuss the consequences for dynamic adjustment
processes and some policy implications.
Keywords: monopolistic competition, monetary policy rule, pricing decisions, strategic
complementarity, strategic substitutability.
JEL classification: E52, C72.
1 Introduction
Strategies are complements [substitutes] if they can be ordered such that higher strategies
by some players raise the incentives for other players to switch to higher [lower] strategies
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as well. Consequently, the best response functions are increasing [respectively decreas-
ing].1 According to the common wisdom, monopolistic competition generates a situation
of strategic complementarity between price-setting firms: the optimal price charged by
each single firm is increasing in the prices set by other firms, the intuition being that for
each firm, higher prices of competing firms raise the demand for the firm’s own product
and lower the elasticity of the demand function for its own goods at any given price: this
is a relative price effect. This result is almost trivial in partial equilibrium models, but it is
not necessarily true in general equilibrium models with endogenous aggregate demand.
If the central bank responds to higher prices by raising the interest rate, higher prices of
the firm’s competitors also raise the aggregate price level and the interest rate, which re-
duces aggregate demand: this is the aggregate demand effect. If the aggregate demand effect
exceeds the relative price effect, demand for a firm’s own brand falls and the firm’s best
response is to lower its price. In this paper, we show that this happens when monetary
policy follows the Taylor principle. If interest rates follow the Taylor principle, then the
respective equilibrium is determinate and stable. Thus, we relate determinacy to strategic
complementarity.
By its impact on the degree of strategic complementarity, the central bank can influ-
ence the adjustment process after nominal demand shocks. If agents have imperfect in-
formation or if they are not perfectly rational, they cannot switch to a new equilibrium
instantaneously after a shock, but need to explore the new equilibrium prices and eventu-
ally converge towards the new equilibrium. Whether prices are strategic complements or
substitutes determines the characteristics of adjustment processes after exogenous shocks.
In the experimental literature, it has been shown that when prices are complements, the
aggregate price level moves slowly, and individual actions are well-coordinated. Prices
overshoot and approach the new equilibrium gradually. When prices are strategic substi-
tutes, the average price level adjusts quickly, but individuals choose very different prices.
They are poorly coordinated for a short time, but fastly coordinate on the new equilib-
rium.2 Thus, by affecting the degree of strategic complementarity, monetary policy also
has an impact on the way that agents respond to shocks which in turn has real economic
consequences. Note that these adjustment processes towards a new equilibrium path come
on top of gradual adjustments of the equilibrium path towards a steady state, where speed
and real effects are caused by market frictions. Rational expectations equilibria of DSGE
models abstract from strategic uncertainty and cannot explain adjustments towards equi-
librium. Understanding how the monetary regime is related to strategic complementarities
helps us filling this void. If we compare two economies, in which a shock raises prices in
their respective equilibria by the same amount, one economy in which prices are comple-
ments and one where they are substitutes, we may expect very distinct adjustment pro-
cesses that are also relevant for policy considerations.
While the New Keynesian literature of the 1980s usually assumed that pricing deci-
1For a formal definition and more details, see Cooper and John (1988).
2We discuss these properties of adjustment processes in more detail in Section 4.
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sions are strategic complements,3 Woodford (2003, p. 160-173) documents that this needs
not be the case in general equilibrium. The inclusion of sticky prices in otherwise stan-
dard RBC models with according calibrations implies that prices are strategic substitutes
(Woodford, 2003, p. 165). However, Woodford (2003) also identifies three reasons why
strategic complementarity may be higher than predicted by the standard model: specific
(vs. common) factor markets (p. 166-167), non-constant elasticity of substitution between
differentiated goods (p. 167-170)4, and the ”economy’s input-output structure”5, in particular
the role of intermediate inputs (p. 170-172). In this paper, we provide an additional source
for changes in the degree of strategic complementarity: in a standard monetary macro set-
up with price-setting firms in monopolistic competition and without frictions, we show
that monetary policy can affect the degree of strategic complementarity and eventually
turns prices from strategic complements into substitutes. The degree of strategic comple-
mentarity represents a monetary policy channel to which only very scarce attention has
been attributed in the literature, in spite of its potentially strong policy implications. In a
closely related paper, Bratsiotis (2007) shows that stronger responses of interest rates to the
aggregate price level reduce strategic complementarity, while responses of interest rates to
the output gap encourage strategic complementarity. He also provides parametric exam-
ples for policy rules that turn prices into substitutes. In this paper, we go a step further by
showing that whether prices are substitutes or complements depends on whether mone-
tary policy follows the Taylor principle or not. We establish that the conditions required for
determinacy of the steady state coincide with conditions for strategic substitutability.
Monetary policy is related to the degree of strategic complementarity between firms’
pricing decisions, because it may respond to the aggregate price level. If monetary policy
follows a strict nominal output target, it depends solely on the curvature of the utility func-
tion whether prices are strategic substitutes or complements as has been demonstrated by
Adam (2007). But, if monetary policy uses a Taylor-type feedback rule, we find that prices
are strategic substitutes if and only if the coefficient by which the interest rate responds to
inflation satisfies the Taylor principle. When firms increase their prices, raising inflation
above target, Taylor-type feedback rules raise the interest rate, except at the zero lower
bound. This lowers consumption demand and creates an incentive for firms to reduce their
prices. In normal times, the monetary policy rule, thus, reduces the degree of strategic com-
plementarity among firms’ pricing decisions and even turns prices into strategic substitutes
rather than complements provided that the aggregate demand effect of monetary policy is
sufficiently strong. By contrast, if monetary policy does not affect the interest rate, as is
the case in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound,
pricing decisions remain strategic complements as in a partial equilibrium model without
3This assumption is related to the fact that this literature usually considered linear utility of consumption,
implying an infinite value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
4Preferences over differentiated goods of the Dixit-Stiglitz form assume a constant elasticity of substitution and
imply a constant mark-up of prices over marginal costs. A relaxation of this assumption may affect the degree of
strategic complementarity. See Kimball (1995) for further details.
5Woodford (2003, p. 170, referring to Basu (1995)). See Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) for further details.
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intertemporal substitution.
Indeterminate equilibria arise if interest rate responses to inflation violate the Taylor
principle, but more generally, when price expectations move in the same direction as prices,
so that there is no stabilization of target rates. In these equilibria, prices are strategic com-
plements because the demand effect is small, when an increase in today’s price level implies
that expected future prices rise even more. This also holds for the non-stationary equilibria
between the target steady state and the liquidity trap equilibrium. Here, deflation feeds
into deflationary expectations and this spiral prevents a rise in today’s demand if the price
falls. We show that in the non-stationary and indeterminate rational expectations equilibria
the demand effect is absent and, hence, prices are strategic complements.
For prices to be strategic substitutes, it is key that the expected real interest rate rises
sufficiently strongly for increasing prices to reduce aggregate demand. If the central bank
has credibility for bringing inflation back to target so quickly that a present price increase
raises expected inflation by less than nominal interest rates, the demand effect kicks in. The
more the real rate responds to prices, the lower their complementarity. For turning prices
into substitutes, expected inflation must have a low variation as compared to the variance
of nominal rates.
We discuss the policy implications of this finding. Indeed, the fact that a monetary
policy rule obeying the Taylor principle turns complements into substitutes is important
for several reasons.
First, in an economy with price rigidities, the degree of strategic complementarity deter-
mines the real effectiveness of monetary policy on the equilibrium path (Woodford, 2003).
In an economy with price rigidities, strategic complementarities in pricing decisions result
in strong inertia after a shock, while the economy rapidly adjusts to a new equilibrium if
prices are strategic substitutes. The more monetary policy responds to a weighted average
of current and expected future inflation, the more it reduces strategic complementarities
and thereby the real effects of nominal demand shocks.
Second, the adjustment process of strategies towards equilibrium depends on whether
strategies are complements or substitutes. Dynamic general equilibrium models describe
the adjustment of prices to shocks along an equilibrium path. They do not answer the ques-
tion whether and how firms will find the equilibrium in a situation of strategic uncertainty.
Experimental evidence (e.g. Assenza et al. (2014) and Heemeijer et al. (2009)) suggests that
the speed of convergence and the stability of equilibrium are negatively related to the de-
gree of strategic complementarity. Hence, a monetary policy obeying the Taylor principle
speeds up the convergence process and contributes to stability not just because it yields a
unique equilibrium but also because it stabilizes the economy in case of shocks to agents’
beliefs about other agents’ actions.
Third, our findings contribute to the discussion of central bank communication and
transparency. If the central bank follows the Taylor principle, prices are strategic substi-
tutes. This leads to more rapid adjustments of the aggregate price level to shocks. The
central bank should therefore be transparent about these shocks (economic transparency).
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In the liquidity trap, prices are strategic complements. Prices respond sluggishly to shocks
and so economic transparency may be harmful.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the economy. Section 3 introduces
the monetary policy rules and shows how they affect the degree of strategic complemen-
tarities. Section 4 concludes by discussing the implications of this finding.
2 The economy
In order to emphasize why monetary policy affects the degree of strategic complementarity,
we use the simplest possible model that allows isolating this effect.6 Consider an economy
derived from a general equilibrium model with flexible prices, populated by a representa-
tive household, a continuum of firms under monopolistic competition, and a central bank.
Firms produce differentiated products and set prices facing individual demand functions
that depend on their own price and on the aggregate price level. The central bank may use
different types of rules that are introduced in Section 3.
2.1 The representative household
The representative household is infinitely lived and maximizes utility from consumption














with σ > 0, φ ≥ 0, and where β ∈ [0, 1] is the personal discount factor arising from time
preference. The representative household maximizes expected utility (1) from consumption












with the elasticity of substitution between goods ε > 1. Households can save or borrow by
holding positive or negative amounts of bonds. The stock of bonds at the start of period t
is denoted by Bt, which gives the household’s budget constraint







6In particular, we do not insert shocks, as we do not need them for the basic argument.
7We follow the notation used in Gali (2008) and Faia (2008).
5
where Πt denotes profits, WtLt is the wage income, and it is the interest rate in period t.



















From this, we get
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di = PtCt, which simplifies the budget constraint. Thus, the



























The first order conditions (leaving out the expectations operator) yield:
C−σt = λtPt, (7)












Solving (7) for the Lagrange parameter and inserting it in (9) gives the Euler equation












where rt is the real interest rate. The Euler equation defines consumption demand in period
t as a function of expected future inflation, future consumption and the current interest
rate. Monetary policy can affect the current interest rate and expected future inflation by
choosing how to respond to the current price level. Thereby, the price level affects current
demand indirectly via its impact on the real interest rate an effect that is absent in partial
equilibrium models where interest rates and future inflation are given exogenously.
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2.2 Firms
Under monopolistic competition, each firm produces one differentiated good and acts as a
price setter for its variety. Prices are flexible (i.e. firms can adjust prices each period). The
production technology of firm i is linear and given by
Yt(i) = Lt(i), (12)
where Yt(i) is the production output and Lt(i) is labor input of firm i at date t. The profit
of firm i is thus given by
Πt(i) = (Pt(i)−Wt)Yt(i). (13)
Market clearing implies that production equals consumption, so that Yt(i) = Ct(i). Firms
maximize profits by setting their own prices, taking the aggregate variables and demand
















ε−1 > 1 is the mark-up factor over marginal costs Wt. The best response function
of firm i with respect to prices of other firms is now hidden by the wage Wt that depends
on the aggregate price level via labor market clearing.8 Hence, we derive how Wt depends
on the prices charged by other firms. We are interested in the degree of strategic comple-
mentarity in a general equilibrium. Since equilibrium prices will be the same for all firms,
we focus on the response to other firms’ prices for the case where all other firms charge the
same price.
2.3 Labor market
Labor demand by firm i is




















8This is why it makes such a big difference of whether one assumes common or specific labor markets as noted
by Woodford (2003).
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Setting aggregate labor demand equal to labor supply, implicitly given by (10), and solving


































































Equation (20) describes a best response function for firm i with respect to the aggregate
price level for a given real interest rate, and for given expectations of future consumption.
It, thus, represents a partial equilibrium approach without intertemporal substitution and
implies strategic complements, as the best response function is increasing, ∂Pt(i)/∂Pt > 0.
3 Central bank’s monetary policy rule
The standard approach in dynamic general equilibrium models is to close the model by a
monetary policy rule, assuming rational expectations and imposing a transversality con-
dition. The central bank may use different types of rules. As a benchmark case, we start
by presenting nominal output targeting, as studied by Adam (2007). In this case, whether
prices are strategic complements or substitutes depends on parameter values of the util-
ity function. We then study feedback (Taylor-type) policy rules by which interest rates re-
spond to inflation. Here, the parameters of this policy function affect the degree of strategic
complementarity as shown by Bratsiotis (2007) and determine whether prices are strategic
complements or substitutes independently from the parameters of the utility function. We
establish that prices are strategic substitutes whenever the equilibrium is determinate.
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3.1 Nominal output targeting




Ȳ Cφ+σ−1t . (21)
Note that nominal output targeting implies that real demand, Ct = Ȳ /Pt, depends nega-






Ȳ (φ+ σ − 1)Cφ+σ−2t
∂Ct
∂Pt
is positive if and only if φ + σ < 1. So, here we get strategic complements depending on
φ+ σ, as in Adam (2007).9
Proposition 1 (Adam, 2007): If the central bank implements a nominal output targeting rule,
prices are strategic complements if φ+ σ < 1 and strategic substitutes if φ+ σ > 1.
Under nominal output targeting, the equilibrium and the best response functions in period
t are independent from expectations about future prices and consumption, because the
central bank does not affect private decisions on the intertemporal allocation via an interest-
rate policy, but rather fixes contemporaneous (nominal) output directly. Marginal costs,
however, depend on the price level. Using Ct = Ȳ /Pt, equation (18) turns into Wt =
Ȳ P 1−φ−σt . Thus, for φ+σ < 1, marginal costs are increasing in the price level. If other firms
increase their price, marginal costs for firm i are rising which induces a higher optimal price
for firm i. The reverse causality holds for φ + σ > 1. For φ + σ = 1, marginal costs do not
depend on the price level and equation (19) turns into Pt(i) = ε/ (ε− 1) Ȳ , i.e. the optimal
price is (locally) independent of the prices set by other firms.
3.2 The Taylor principle and strategic substitutability
We now assume that the central bank implements a feedback rule for the interest rate
(Taylor-type rule):
it = ī+ δ (πt − π
∗) , (22)
where πt = Pt/Pt−1 − 1. π
∗ is the inflation target and ī is the nominal interest rate that
results from target inflation and the natural real interest rate, denoted by r̄, i.e.
1 + ī = (1 + r̄) (1 + π∗) . (23)
If the interest rate responds to inflation with a coefficient δ > 1 + r̄ (Taylor principle), the
steady state is the only equilibrium consistent with the transversality condition and deter-
mines expected future inflation at the target rate π∗.10 Note that this standard approach
9Adam (2007, p. 272) defines a parameter ξ that equals φ+ σ for our utility function.
10See Woodford (2003, Chapter 2, p. 91). The fact that we have δ > 1 + r̄ instead of the usual δ > 1 stems from
our renouncement of log-linear approximations. See Appendix A for more details.
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requires a feedback rule that does not account for the zero lower bound on interest rates.
We will use this as a benchmark and consider the zero lower bound in Section 3.3 below.
Since prices are assumed to be flexible, expected future consumption is not affected by to-
day’s price level. Inserting the policy rule (22) into (20), gives the best response function of










































































































































Apparently, the derivative gets smaller if δ rises. Thus, a more aggressive response of
interest rates to inflation reduces the degree of strategic complementarity. The derivative is










(1 + πt)− πt + π
∗
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(1 + πt) + 1 + π
∗
)
< 1 + ī









Thus, prices are strategic complements if and only if the feedback parameter δ is sufficiently
small compared to the right-hand side of (26). Otherwise prices are strategic substitutes.
Suppose that the current rate of inflation is close to the target rate π∗, as is the case in a
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· (1 + r̄) . (27)
Thus, for any δ > 1 + r̄, we get strategic substitutes, because σ
φ+σ < 1 and, thus, δ > 1 + r̄
implies that inequality (27) is reversed.
Proposition 2 : If the central bank implements a feedback rule for the interest rate such that δ >
1 + r̄, firms’ best response functions are decreasing around the steady-state equilibrium. Thus, in
equilibrium, prices are strategic substitutes.
The central bank, via its stabilization policy, turns prices into strategic substitutes. Taylor-
type monetary policy rules are related to the degree of strategic complementarity between
firms’ pricing decisions, because monetary policy responds to the aggregate price level.
When monopolistic competitive firms increase their price, they generate inflation, which
implies a higher interest rate set by the central bank via its monetary policy rule. Increasing
the interest rate reduces consumption demand. This reduction in consumption gives an
incentive for profit-maximizing firms to reduce their prices. In normal times, the monetary
policy rule thus induces a decrease in the degree of strategic complementarities among
firms’ pricing decisions and even turns actions into substitutes rather than complements if
the effect on demand is sufficiently strong. The impact of prices on the interest rate that
yields strategic substitutability is not a razor’s edge case, but is instead robust with respect
to different parameter calibrations. Notice, however, that such a result may not hold when
monetary policy does not affect the interest rate, as it is the case in a liquidity trap, as we
explain next.
3.3 The zero lower bound and strategic complementarity
The Taylor rule (22) does not account for the zero lower bound on interest rates. As in most
dynamic general equilibrium models, it should, therefore, only be considered for inflation
rates sufficiently close to or above the steady state. If inflation becomes very small, in
particular negative, monetary policy cannot respond with the same linear rule to current
prices, because negative interest rates would allow for arbitrage profits. We account for
this by extending the monetary policy rule such that
it =
{
ī+ δ (πt − π





This also affects the slope of a firm’s best response function with respect to the aggregate
price level. If πt < π
















Due to the stability of the liquidity-trap equilibrium in dynamic general equilibrium mod-
els,11 we may replace expected future inflation with the inflation rate in the liquidity trap





























































Thus, prices are strategic complements if the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap.
Proposition 3 : In the liquidity trap, prices are strategic complements.
In a liquidity trap, neither the interest rate nor future expected inflation are affected by
small changes in the current rate of inflation. Thus, small changes of other firms’ prices
have no impact on the intertemporal substitution and, thus, pricing decisions are strategic
complements as in a partial equilibrium model.
3.4 Indeterminate equilibria and strategic complementarity
With a coefficient δ < 1 + r̄, the equilibrium is indeterminate if the central bank follows
feedback rule (22). A pure interest rate peg is a special case of this with δ = 0. Even though
any inflation rate may be an equilibrium in such an economy, we may still evaluate the
firms’ best response function in such an equilibrium.
Combining the Fisher equation,
1 + it
1 + r̄
= 1 + Et (πt+1) , (32)
with feedback rule (22) yields
1 + Et (πt+1) =
ī+ δ (πt − π
∗)
1 + r̄
⇔ Et (πt+1) = f (πt) =




11See, e.g., Benhabib, Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2002, p. 544): the steady-state is such that the inflation rate is
constant.
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Because f ′ < 1, any price path with πt+1 = f (πt) is a rational expectations equilibrium.
Here, a change in current inflation also affects expected future inflation, while for δ >
1+ r̄, the rational expectations equilibrium is determinate and associated with an expected
inflation rate of π∗ independent of current inflation.
Inserting (33) together with policy rule (22) into Equation (20), gives the best response












































As f ′ > 0, an increase in current inflation leads to an increase in inflationary expectations.
Higher expected future prices increase current demand and work against the demand re-
duction coming from higher nominal interest rates. Around an equilibrium, the best re-
sponse function is increasing as in a partial equilibrium or in the case of the zero-lower
bound and, hence, prices are strategic complements. The reason is that in any rational ex-
pectations equilibrium, for δ < 1 + r̄, the effects of a marginal change in the current price
level on nominal interest rate and expected future inflation offset each other, so that the
real interest rate stays constant and aggregate demand is independent from the current
price level.12
Proposition 4 : When monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule with δ < 1 + r̄, prices are
strategic complements in any equilibrium.
Note that the same logic also applies to any non-stationary equilibrium for δ > 1+ r̄. As we
know from Benhabib, Schmidt-Grohé and Uribe (2002), the zero lower bound on interest
rates leads to two steady states and a continuum of non-stationary equilibria with starting
values anywhere between these steady states. In these non-stationary equilibria, we have
Et (πt+1) =
{
f (πt) if it > 0
πL if it = 0.
(35)
In the first case, the aggregate demand effect is silenced, because an increase in the current
price level raises expected future inflation by the same amount as nominal interest rates.
Here, we get the same results as for δ < 1 + r̄. The second case arises when the economy
falls into the zero-lower bound and is treated in Section 3.3. In both cases, the real interest
rate is not affected by changes in the aggregate price level and, hence, the aggregate de-
12The relationship between determinacy and substitutability can also be shown with a log-linear approximation
of the model. For more details, see Appendix B.
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mand effect is absent, leaving us with the relative price effect for which prices are strategic
complements.
These considerations require that the economy follows a rational expectations equilib-
rium. Of course, equilibrium indeterminacy casts serious doubts on this prerequisite. If
expectations are not rational, then prices may be substitutes or complements, depending
on how the current rate of inflation affects expected future inflation.
3.5 Interpretation
In this section, we discuss the logic behind the results that we obtained in Section 3. This
allows drawing further conclusions about the degree of strategic complementarity during
different phases of an economy and how it is affected by monetary policy. Whether prices
are strategic substitutes or complements, depends on how current inflation affects demand
via the Euler equation. Replacing aggregate demand Ct by the Euler equation, the best
response function becomes
The best response function displays two effects: the relative price effect and the aggre-
gate demand effect. The relative price effect comes from substitutability of products and
reflects the partial-equilibrium view. The aggregate demand effect arises from the Euler
equation via two channels: current prices may affect the interest rate (interest rate channel)
and expected future inflation (inflation expectation channel). Higher interest rates make
future goods relatively cheaper and reduce current demand, higher expected future prices
have the opposite effect.
The aggregate demand effect is purely driven by expectations. Agents consume less
today if they expect to get more goods tomorrow for the same amount of today’s money.
If the expected real interest rate rises in response to a price increase, the demand effect
works against the price effect and reduces strategic complementarities. For prices to be-
come strategic substitutes, the demand effect must be sufficiently strong. This requires a
strong response of the expected real rate on price changes that can be obtained by strong
responses of the nominal rate and weak responses of expected inflation.
For determinate equilibria, expected inflation is fixed and current prices affect demand
only via the interest rate channel. Determinacy requires that interest rates respond so strongly
to current inflation that the aggregate demand effect dominates the relative price effect.
At the zero lower bound, neither the interest rate it nor the expected inflation respond
to current prices. The real rate is exogenously given and the aggregate demand effect is
absent. Here, best responses are given by the relative price effect as in partial equilibrium,
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which implies that prices are strategic complements. Note that this does not hinge on price
expectations being given by πL. If agents would believe in the target rate π∗, we would
see no demand effect either. The expectation channel requires that current inflation has an
impact on expected future inflation.
Suppose that expectations respond to current inflation. To escape the liquidity trap,
the central bank has to keep interest rates low for some time, when inflation starts rising.
If expected inflation is responding positively on current inflation, higher prices increase
current demand and the demand effect works in the same direction as the aggregate price
effect. An increase in today’s prices raises inflation expectations, lowers the real interest
rate, and stimulates demand. On such an escape trail, the demand effect works in the same
direction as the relative price effect and strategic complementarities are even higher than
in the respective partial equilibrium.
For indeterminate and non-stationary equilibria, expected inflation responds one-to-
one with nominal interest rate. The two effects cancel each other. The real rate is exoge-
nously given and there is no aggregate demand effect, implying prices are strategic com-
plements as in the partial equilibrium. But note that if the central bank violates the Taylor
principle, it may affect inflation expectations by communication and other strategies that
are also related to the bank’s credibility. As we have multiple equilibria for such a policy,
equilibrium selection is a subtle issue and expectations may be self-fulfilling. The better
the central bank anchors inflation expectations, the smaller is the interest rate response
that is required to achieve the desired demand effect. The higher the stability of inflation
expectations, the lower are strategic complementarities.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown how monetary policy affects the degree of strategic comple-
mentarity between firms’ pricing decisions. Interest-rate responses to current inflation re-
duce the degree of strategic complementarity. If monetary policy follows the Taylor princi-
ple, it turns prices into strategic substitutes. By contrast, in a liquidity trap where monetary
policy is restricted by the zero lower bound, pricing decisions are strategic complements.
The degree of strategic complementarity has some implications for the adjustment to
shocks and for the effectiveness of policy measures, for the speed of convergence to equi-
librium after a shock, for the stability of the economy in response to belief shocks, and for
the welfare effects of transparency. Here, we want to summarize these implications.
4.1 Strategic complementarity and price rigidity
The effects of shocks on equilibrium prices are part of the standard analysis of DSGE mod-
els. In an economy with sticky prices, monetary policy has larger real effects, if the degree
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of strategic complementarities is higher (Woodford, 2003).13 The reason is that firms who
know that some prices are not adjusted after a shock in nominal spending have an incentive
to keep their own price changes small so that average prices adjust less than in a flex-price
equilibrium. Thereby, nominal shocks exert a real effect. In addition, predictable price in-
creases by firms who adjust their prices with a delay contribute to expected inflation which
raises current demand even further and also raises the degree of strategic complementar-
ities. In an economy with price rigidities, strategic complementarities in pricing decisions
result in strong inertia after a shock, while the economy rapidly adjusts to a new equilib-
rium under strategic substitutes.
The more monetary policy responds to a weighted average of current and expected fu-
ture inflation, the more it reduces strategic complementarities. In a context with strategic
complementarities, firms have a relatively high incentive to coordinate their prices. If oth-
ers are unable to change prices, it may be optimal for those who can adjust their prices
not to do so because they expect others will not. By contrast, if prices are strategic sub-
stitutes, firms have an incentive to change their prices even more if others cannot do it.
This increases price dispersion for a while, but keeps the average price level closer to the
flex-price equilibrium which also means that real effects are smaller.
4.2 Adjustments towards equilibrium
While the effects analysed by DSGE models occur on the equilibrium path, experiments
teach us that the degree of strategic complementarity also relates to the adjustment of in-
dividual actions towards the equilibrium after a shock. DSGE models do not answer the
question whether and how firms will find the equilibrium in a situation of strategic uncer-
tainty.
Consider an economy in equilibrium that is hit by a shock that demands price changes
by firms to stay in equilibrium. Assume that firms have limited and asymmetric informa-
tion so that they do not immediately find the new full-information equilibrium. If prices are
strategic substitutes, any deviation of the general price level from the new full-information
equilibrium in one direction incentivises firms to deviate in the other. If prices are above
equilibrium, firms reduce their prices and vice versa. Thus, prices quickly converge to
equilibrium. By contrast, if prices are strategic complements, deviations of the general
price level provide incentives to deviate in the same direction. Deviations reinforce each
other. If prices are above equilibrium, firms who have set prices at or below equilibrium
have an incentive to raise their prices above equilibrium and those who set prices above
13As noted by Woodford (2003, p. 163), ”it is the existence (or not) of strategic complementarity that determines
whether the fraction of the suppliers with sticky prices exert a disproportionate effect upon the degree of adjustment of the
aggregate price index. The intuition for this is simple: If prices are strategic complements, then the fraction of prices that
do not adjust in response to a disturbance to nominal spending lead even the flexible-price suppliers to adjust their prices by
less than they would otherwise. If the strategic complementarity is strong enough, there is little aggregate-price adjustment
(and so a large output effect) even if the fraction of flexible-price suppliers is large (though less than one). On the other hand,
if prices are strategic substitutes, then the aggregate price level may adjust nearly in proportion to the unexpected change
in nominal spending, even when many prices are sticky. For in this case, the fact that some prices do not adjust causes the
flexible-price suppliers to compensate by adjusting their prices even more than they would in a flexible-price equilibrium”.
16
equilibrium already, will stay above the equilibrium as well, even if they get better infor-
mation and adjust towards the fundamental value. The average may rise for some time and
induce agents to extrapolate the direction of change. Thus, we may expect a considerable
overshooting of prices after a shock if prices are strategic complements.
Whether and how fast agents find a new equilibrium after a shock is an empirical ques-
tion, because rational expectations models assume that agents jump towards the new equi-
librium. In these models, history dependence is obtained by adding frictions to the adjust-
ment process (e.g. sticky prices or sticky information) that eventually smooth the equilib-
rium path towards the new steady state.
Experimental evidence suggests that different adjustment processes are at stake de-
pending on whether the environment is characterized by strategic substitutability or strate-
gic complementarity. Fehr and Tyran (2005) summarize evidence on the adjustment pro-
cesses driven by subjects in laboratory experiments. ”Under strategic complementarity, a small
amount of individual irrationality may lead to large deviations from the aggregate predictions of
rational models; under strategic substitutability, a minority of rational agents may suffice to gen-
erate aggregate outcomes consistent with the predictions of rational models. Thus, the presence of
strategic substitutability or complementarity seems to be a key condition in determining when a
population that is heterogeneous with regard to rationality reaches either a ”rational” or an ”irra-
tional” outcome” (Fehr and Tyran, 2005, p. 44). Under strategic complementarity even many
players who are capable of calculating the new equilibrium, will not act accordingly, be-
cause they expect others to deviate.14 If a significant fraction of players is expected to have
adaptive expectations, the best response leads to a slow adjustment towards a new equilib-
rium under complementarity, but leads to a temporary overshooting of actions and quick
adjustment to the new equilibrium under substitutes. Fehr and Tyran (2008) report that in
their experiment twice as many subjects expect equilibrium prices under substitutability
than under complementarity. Thus, players also seem to expect a faster convergence and
behave as if they attribute more rationality to other players.
Hommes (2011) and Assenza et al. (2014) survey learning-to-forecast experiments. In
these experiments, participating subjects forecast prices, while the realized price depends
on the average forecast. In a positive (negative) feedback system, an increase in the average
forecast leads to an increase (a decrease) in the market price.15 A main conclusion of this
literature is that after a shock, subjects learn the new rational equilibrium rather fastly in
the negative feedback system, while it takes subjects much longer to learn it in the posi-
tive feedback system. Figure 1 (taken from Assenza et al. (2014) and based on Bao et al.
(2012)) presents an example of an experiment in which subjects adjust their price forecasts
to shocks. In each economy, 6 subjects repeatedly submit price-level forecasts. Each period,
14Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) present a model in which strategic complementarities induce naive agents
to have a disproportionate impact on equilibrium outcomes in comparison to those who form rational expecta-
tions.
15Note here that a negative feedback system exactly corresponds to a situation in which stated expectations
are strategic substitutes, while a positive feedback system to a situation in which stated expectations are strategic
complements.
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Figure 1: Adjustment processes under strategic complements and substitutes - Notes:
strategic complements (left panels) and substitutes (right panels). The upper graphs show
the average expected price, lower graphs show subjects’ individual expectations. Source:
Assenza et al. (2014), p 32.
the computer generates realized prices based on a DSGE model in which distinct produc-
ers set their prices based on distinct subjects’ forecasts. In the positive feedback system,
dPi
dP
= 2021 , in the negative feedback system,
dPi
dP
= − 2021 . These may be high degrees of
strategic complementarity and substitutability as compared to a macro-economy, but they
clarify the distinct patterns of adjustment processes. The figures show average prices in
the upper panel and individual price forecasts in the lower panel. There are two shocks
in Periods 20 and 43. The equilibrium path is represented by the broken line and it is the
same for both economies.
In the case of strategic complements (left panel), the adjustment process is cyclical with
waves building up that overshoot the new equilibrium before price adjustments change
direction. Subjects seem to interpolate past price changes for their forecasts. Thus, it needs
an overshooting until they realize that they should reverse their adjustments. The lower
graph shows that individual expectations are very well coordinated (except for the initial
periods). Shocks have no big impact on the degree of coordination.
In the case of strategic substitutability or negative feedback (right panel), fast conver-
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gence to a new equilibrium is observed. Shocks have large immediate effects and may even
lead to a temporary overshooting of expectations. The lower graph shows that individual
expectations are poorly coordinated during the first periods after each shock. But, the av-
erage price level adjusts quickly to the new equilibrium and once that is reached, subjects
are also well coordinated. In this environment, the theoretical swing described by the ratio-
nal expectation equilibrium suitably accounts for the observations except for the first few
periods after a shock.
If one compares the adjustment processes across different groups of subjects from the
same experiment, the aforementioned characteristics are observed regularly. The amount
of overshooting and mis-coordination in the case of substitutes varies between groups.
Under complements, the lengths and amplitude of waves varies. This has consequences for
predictability. In an economy with strategic complements the equilibrium gives a reliable
prediction for medium- and long-term adjustment. Short-term predictions, however, are
difficult and unreliable. Under strategic complements, the opposite is true. As shocks
have small immediate effects and price changes are gradual, short-run predictions can be
made rather accurately, but if the length of waves and overshooting is unpredictable, then
medium- and long-term forecasts are unreliable.
Experimental evidence suggests that the speed of convergence and the stability of equi-
libria are negatively related to the degree of strategic complementarity. In the light of our
results, a monetary policy that follows the Taylor principle leads to strategic substitutabil-
ity, speeds up the convergence process towards equilibrium, and allows good medium-
term forecasts at the expense of temporary mis-coordination and only small real effects.
Thus, the Taylor principle contributes to stability not just because it yields a unique equi-
librium but also, because it stabilizes the economy from shocks to agents’ beliefs about
other agents’ actions.
If monetary policy chooses milder responses to inflation or if the economy is stuck in
the liquidity trap, prices are strategic complements and nominal spending shocks have
small immediate price effects, allowing for larger real effects. The adjustment towards the
new equilibrium is slow and medium-term forecasts are unreliable. This also burdens the
central bank that might wish to use its forecasting reputation to guide the economy out of a
liquidity trap. With medium- and long-term forecasts being unreliable, forward guidance
lacks the credibility that it requires to be effective.
4.3 Optimal transparency
Our results provide some new insights on the optimal communication strategy of central
banks. We know from the coordination games literature in the vein of Morris and Shin
(2002) and their applications to macroeconomics by e.g. Angeletos, Iovino and La’O (2016),
Angeletos and La’O (2012), and Lorenzoni (2009, 2010) that the degree of strategic comple-
mentarities impacts the welfare effects of public signals.
As pointed out by Angeletos and Pavan (2007), whether a commitment to disclose cen-
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tral bank information raises or reduces expected welfare depends crucially on whether the
equilibrium degree of coordination is below or above the efficient degree of coordination.
In the Morris and Shin (2002) benchmark case where coordination does not matter at the
social level, transparency (i.e. an increase in the precision of public information) reduces
welfare.16 By contrast, in micro-founded macro-applications, where coordination enters so-
cial welfare in the same extent as fundamentals do, transparency is always beneficial. For
any welfare function in between these two extremes, transparency may be detrimental, if
prices are strategic complements. In a situation of strategic substitutability, instead, public
announcements are generally beneficial, because agents are less responsive to them and,
thus, any piece of additional public information helps agents to predict the fundamentals
and take decisions that are closer to a full-information equilibrium.
While it is usually believed that macro environments are characterized by strategic com-
plementarities, especially under monopolistic competition, we show that with a monetary
policy obeying the Taylor principle, this is not likely to be true. If the central bank interest
rate responds to the price level with a sufficiently large weight, prices are strategic substi-
tutes and transparency is beneficial for expected welfare.
If the coefficient by which the interest rate responds to prices is rather small, as in a liq-
uidity trap, transparency may be harmful. This implies different communication strategies,
depending on the economic situation.17 While the literature has usually dealt with trans-
parency policy issues as unconditional settings of the precision of public signals, our find-
ings call for a differentiated communication policy for central banks depending on whether
the economy is in a liquidity trap or not.
16If prices are strategic complements, firms have an incentive to coordinate their expectations on the public
signal and pay too little attention to their own private signals as compared to the Bayesian weights of these signals.
If the public signal happens to deviate from fundamentals, private expectations deviate in the same direction. In
extreme cases, these deviations may reduce welfare as compared to a situation without public signals.
17The same could be said about monetary policy in the 1970s. Estimated coefficients of interest-rate responses
to inflation for this period are often lower than 1. This opens the possibility for strategic complementarities under
which transparency may be harmful. The move towards a more active monetary policy during the 1980s and
1990s came along with a transition towards more transparent central banks. Our results offer the hypothesis that
these two developments have been closely related.
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For our arguments, we do not need to log-linearize the model and can, thus, derive pre-
cise results instead of approximations. In this appendix, we first show that determinacy
requires δ > 1 + r̄ if we use the linear feedback rule (22). Then, we show that for the
appropriate non-linear feedback rule that yields the linear rule version as logarithmic ap-
proximation, we also get that prices are strategic substitutes if the steady-state equilibrium
is determinate.
Combining the non-linearized version of the Fisher equation (32) with feedback rule (22)
yields
1 + Et (πt+1) =




In a rational expectations equilibrium with flexible prices, the expected real interest rate in
future periods is r̄. Thus, forwarding the previous equation yields
1 + Et (πt+2) =
1 + ī+ δ (Et (πt+1)− π
∗)
1 + r̄
⇔ Et (πt+2) = f (Et (πt+1)) =




If f ′ < 1 ⇔ δ < 1 + r̄, any price path with πt+1 = f (πt) is a rational expectations equi-
librium. Here, a change in current inflation also affects expected future inflation, while for
δ > 1 + r̄ the rational expectations equilibrium is determinate and associated with an ex-
pected inflation rate of π∗.
The linear Taylor rule was thought for model in logs. Since we have a non-logarithmic
model, we might also use a non-logarithmic version of the Taylor rule. Suppose,






Then, ln (1 + it) = ln (1 + ī) + δ (ln (1 + πt)− ln (1 + π
∗)) ≈ it = ī + δ (πt − π
∗). Thus, the
linear Taylor rule (22) is a logarithmic approximation of (36).
Combining the Fisher equation (32) with feedback rule (36) yields








In equilibrium the real interest rate must equal the rate of time preference as can be seen
from (11): since our economy is not growing, in equilibrium Ct+1 = Ct and β (1 + r̄) = 1.
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Thus, in a rational expectations equilibrium, using 1 + ī = (1 + r̄) (1 + π∗), implies
1 + Et (πt+1)
1 + π∗






Forwarding the equation yields
1 + Et (πt+2)
1 + π∗






If δ > 1, then inflation is exploding for any πt > π
∗ and converges to −100% for πt <
π∗. Applying the usual transversality conditions rules these paths out as equilibria. If
δ < 1, any price path with πt+1 = f (πt) is a rational expectations equilibrium. Here, a
change in current inflation also affects expected future inflation, while for δ > 1 the rational
expectations equilibrium is determinate and associated with an expected inflation rate of
Et (πt+1) = π
∗.


































Hence, we find that prices are strategic substitutes for δ > 1.
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Appendix B: Log-linearized approximation
Here, we use the log-linearized approximations of equilibrium conditions to explain the
relation between determinacy and strategic substitutability. The log-linearized version of
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If δ > 1, then inflation is exploding for any πt > π
∗ and converges to −100% for πt <
π∗. Applying the usual transversality conditions rules these paths out as equilibria and
leaves us with an expected future inflation πt+1 = π
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For δ > 1, this derivative is negative and, thus, prices are strategic substitutes. At the zero


























where πL < π∗ is the inflation rate in the liquidity trap equilibrium. The demand effect is




If δ < 1, the equilibrium is indeterminate and the expected future rate of inflation depends
positively on the current rate of inflation. Therefore, a higher current price level increases
expected future inflation, which opens an additional channel. Combining the linear ap-
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proximation of the Fisher equation, it − r̄ ≈ Et (πt+1), with feedback rule (22) yields
Et (πt+1) = f (πt) ≈ ī− r̄ + δ (πt − π
∗) . (42)
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As in the liquidity trap, the demand effect is also muted, but for a different reason. Here,
the interest rate rises in response to increasing prices, but expected future prices rise along





Thus, in all indeterminate equilibria, prices are strategic complements.
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